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 ABSTRACT 
There are multiple studies investigating firm performance, in particular studies 
identifying firm characteristics that drive performance. On the other hand, research on 
the pricing of audit fees provides credible evidence that the financial condition of a 
client is a critical factor, in the sense that riskier clients demand more thorough audit 
procedures. This study investigates the relationship between audit fees and firm 
performance. Using a sample of U.S. publicly traded, non-financial firms covering the 
period from 2000 to 2008, a fixed effects model is presented to estimate firm operating 
performance. The model included standard control variables, such as size, leverage, 
sales growth and research and development intensity. In addition, measures of corporate 
governance were introduced. This study provides empirical evidence on the relationship 
between firm performance and audit fees. Specifically, increases (decreases) in 
operating performance are connected with decreases (increases) in audit fees. This 
investigation provides initial grounds on the performance perspective of the stated 
association. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the relationship between audit fees and firm 
performance. In order to make decisions, investors must consider all relevant 
information about firm performance, and primarily rely on financial statement 
information. These statements include, in particular, information on fees for audit and 
non-audit services, subject to mandatory disclosure in the U.S. since 2001 (SEC, 2000). 
Audit fees have been shown to be related to corporate performance (Hay et al., 2006; 
Stanley, 2011). Auditors have a potentially privileged position to forecast the client’s 
economic condition. The risk-based approach of audit planning and subsequent pricing 
means that clients perceived by the auditor as risky are typically assigned more labor 
(Bell et al., 2008), which in turn results in higher audit fees. So, audit fees are expected 
to be a sign of current and future performance (Stanley, 2011). 
This research analyzes both theoretically and empirically the relationship 
between audit fees and firm performance. After specifying the context in which such 
association arises, a sample of U.S. publicly traded, non-financial firms covering the 
period from 2000 to 2008 is used in fixed effects regressions on firm operating 
performance, using the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator. The dataset is 
mainly composed of financial statement information, downloaded from Thomson 
Datastream. 
This research can be included among the studies that analyze determinants of 
firm performance. The empirical model includes standard control variables, such as 
size, leverage, sales growth and research and development intensity. In what concerns 
the influence of corporate governance on corporate performance, the entrenchment 
index (E-Index) developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009b) is used. As an additional test, this 
index is substituted by the insider ownership or the institutional ownership of the firm. 
Moreover, external auditing and corporate governance can be seen as complementary 
controls, i.e. a firm with more efficient corporate governance is likely to require more 
external auditing services (Hay et al., 2008). In view of this evidence, it will be 
interesting to see if governance and audit fees are both relevant when studying firm 
performance. 
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Empirical tests provide evidence on the negative relationship between firm 
performance and audit fees. Specifically, increases (decreases) in operating performance 
are connected with decreases (increases) in audit fees. This relationship also applies to 
financial performance. Even though more research is needed, this investigation provides 
initial grounds on the performance perspective of the stated association. Previous 
studies found that the economic condition of a client firm plays an important role in the 
amount of fees paid to the auditor. Additionally, this study documents a negative impact 
of audit fees on firm performance, so, the main contribution of this research adds both 
to the audit pricing and to the firm performance literatures. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, the relevant 
literature is reviewed and the theoretical hypothesis is developed. Then, sample 
construction and model specification are displayed. The fourth section presents and 
discusses estimation results. Concluding remarks and future research suggestions are 
provided in the fifth section. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
As stated in the first section, the objective of this study is to analyze the 
relationship between firm performance and audit fees. To do so, it is necessary, on the 
one hand, to consider commonly accepted factors of firm performance, and, on the other 
hand, to understand the origins of the referred relationship. Consequently, this section 
begins with a review of the main determinants of firm performance, which are later on 
included as control variables in the constructed model. Then, significant contributions to 
the audit pricing literature are analyzed, in order to comprehend how audit fees relate to 
firm performance. Lastly, this study’s hypothesis is developed. 
Determinants of Firm Performance 
Many have been the studies of the impact on firm performance of a particular 
phenomenon. This segment provides a review of investigators’ work on presumably key 
drivers of firm performance. 
Lee (2009) examines the particular importance of size among the determinants 
of firm performance. According to this author, there are three types of factors affecting 
firm performance. The first concerns the general economic conditions (i.e., the business 
cycle); the second relates to the firm’s market environment (i.e. its industry context); 
and the third regards firm-specific factors, which include size, market share, sales 
growth, inventory management, debt management, capital intensity, advertising 
intensity and research and development expenses. Because the last three factors may 
constitute entry barriers, they can be viewed as firm-specific (but) industry oriented-
factors. Indeed, Artz et al. (2010) show that research and development spending can 
have an impact in performance when associated with effective inventions and 
innovations (patents and product announcements), thus showing improvements in the 
firm’s competitive position. 
Another line of research focuses on the influence of corporate governance. A 
well governed firm for the purpose of its influence on firm value or performance is 
described, for example, as: (1) a firm in which shareholders’ rights are not restricted 
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(e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009b); (2) a firm whose directors or board 
members have adequate ownership (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2008); or (3) a firm whose 
owners apply tactics to influence managerial activities (e.g., Connelly et al., 2010). 
Hence, it seems there is a fair preoccupation on the alignment of shareholders’ and 
managers’ interests/conduct. Results show that good governance faced as in (1) is 
associated with increased firm value and stock market performance (Gompers et al., 
2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009b), but after considering the inter-relations between 
governance and performance such association only applies to operating performance 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). The ownership of board members (as in (2)) is also 
associated with current and future operating performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
Management’s awareness of diverse owner interests increases shareholder influence on 
firm performance and strategy (Connelly et al., 2010). 
Audit Fees and Firm Performance 
There is a significant branch of literature dedicated to the understanding of audit 
pricing. In 1980, Simunic developed a representative model of the process by which 
audit fees are determined, and since then various authors have continued to bring forth 
empirical results that show which factors concur to the setting of audit fees. In this 
segment some of those contributions relevant to this study are reviewed. 
Theoretically, the amount of fees for audit services that a client firm pays to its 
audit firm reflects the level of audit work the latter has to perform in the auditing 
process. The definition of this level of work embodies the auditor’s assessment of the 
process’s complexity and the desired level of risk. In other words, all other things 
considered, if an auditor wishes to decrease the risk of issuing a clean opinion when 
there are materially relevant distortions in the client’s financial statements, he generally 
acts on the nature, extent and timing of audit procedures, which, naturally, influence the 
final amount of required fees. 
Additionally, increasing audit efforts are determined by the audit firm’s 
likelihood of incurring in future losses due to the engagement with that specific client 
(e.g., Bell et al., 2008; Choi et al., 2008; Simunic and Stein, 1996). Those losses include 
litigation costs, sanctions from regulatory entities and image and reputation damages. 
There is empirical evidence that when there is a perception of high levels of liability 
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exposure, audit firms adjust their required fees (Simunic and Stein, 1996); audit fees are 
influenced by the litigation environment (i.e. the legal regimes of different countries) 
where the audit firms operate on (Choi et al., 2008); in the face of increasing litigation 
costs, big audit firms have avoided engagements with risky clients (Jones and 
Raghunandan, 1998). Pratt and Stice (1994) also found evidence of the existence of an 
additional premium (relative to increasing level of work) to cover litigation costs. 
How exactly do audit firms assess risk engagement, according operation 
complexity, consequent level of work and corresponding price? Several studies have 
found, among others, client characteristics that play an important role in this setting. 
Meta-analyses of audit fee research conducted by Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2012) 
report significant associations between audit fees and the following client attributes: 
size (measured, for example, by total assets, or sales), complexity (e.g., number of 
subsidiaries, business segments, foreign subsidiaries), risk (e.g., inventory and/or 
receivables), profitability (e.g., return on investment, loss), leverage and liquidity, 
internal control, governance (e.g., outside directors, audit committee) and industry. This 
evidence indicates, in particular (and most notably for this study), the influence of some 
measures of the client’s financial condition on audit fees’ determination. An interesting 
recent finding is that audit fees reflect the client’s future performance, because auditors 
have access to some information that contains forward-looking judgments (e.g., 
uncollectible receivables, obsolete inventory, pension and warranty costs) (Stanley, 
2011). Moreover, the disclosed audit fee is also found to be related with errors in 
forecasts of earnings made by financial analysts, which could indicate a superlative 
precision in the predictions of auditors when compared with the predictions of financial 
analysts. The potential usefulness of this evidence is, of course, a sign embed in the 
disclosed audit fee of the firm’s future economic condition other market participants 
could pay attention to. 
Hypothesis 
As stated before, when pricing their services auditors have in consideration 
information provided by the client firm. This information may be indicative of the 
firm’s current and future economic condition, and there has been empirical evidence 
relating the disclosed audit fees with the client’s current operating performance. Should 
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this connection be true, then a firm’s operating performance may in part be explained 
with current audit expenses. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
[H]: The operating performance of a firm is associated with current year audit fees. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section is dedicated to the outline of this study’s model. Initially, the 
sampling process is described. Secondly, selected variables and respective definitions 
and sources are presented. Lastly, the equation subject to regression is delineated, as 
well as predictions of coefficients’ signs. 
Sample 
During this research, there was a constant vigilance regarding data requirement 
versus data availability. The principal source was the database Thomson Datastream, 
which holds extensive historical financial information. However, in order to account for 
corporate governance mechanisms in the performance model, a different source was 
needed, since Thomson Datastream does not provide many variables concerning 
corporate governance. Access to corporate governance specific databases was 
impractical due to financial restraints. Therefore, it was decided that a publicly available 
measure should be used. 
The Harvard Law School provides at its Program on Corporate Governance 
webpage data on a corporate governance index – the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009b) – 
for firms followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) that could be 
most successfully identified by Thomson Datastream. According to Bebchuk et al. 
(2009b), each IRRC publication includes corporate governance information for 
approximately 1400 to 1800 firms, which represent more than 90% of the U.S. stock 
market capitalization. 
From the year 2000 to the year 2008, the E-index file contains observations for 
2881 unique firms without dual-class stock, of which Thomson Datastream identified 
2656. Because financial firms have a different structure than non-financial firms, those 
that presented two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 60 and 
69 were excluded from the sample (following Stanley, 2011). Consult Table 1 for the 
number of firm-year observations available for each of the variables used in this study. 
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Table 7 in the appendix section provides the industry profile of sample firms using the 
49 industry classification of Fama and French. 
Variables 
Table 1 provides variable definitions and data sources. The majority of variables 
derives from financial statement information and was retrieved from Thomson 
Datastream. 
There is empirical evidence that when audit firms determine their fees they rely 
on certain client characteristics, one of them being the client’s financial condition 
(Simunic, 1980; Pratt and Stice, 1994; Choi et al., 2010). Stanley (2011) uses an 
operating performance factor in his audit fee model as representative of the client 
business risk. In order to assess how audit fees relate to firm performance a set of 
performance and firm value measures were, therefore, used: earning power (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008), return on assets (Lee, 2009), return on equity (Sami et al., 2011), and 
Tobin’s Q (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009b; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). The 
main focus of this study is operating performance, but financial performance and firm 
value measures were alternatively introduced as dependent variables, to see if the test 
variable holds its (ir)relevance. 
The audit fees variable was initially introduced in logs, as is usual in the audit 
pricing literature. The performance model includes the following control variables: 
assets (in logs), for firm size (Lee, 2009), research and development intensity (Lee, 
2009; Connelly et al., 2010), capital intensity (Lee, 2009), sales growth (Lee, 2009), 
leverage (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2009b), and the E-index as 
representative of corporate governance (Bebchuk et al., 2009b; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008). This last variable can assume the values zero to six if a firm in a certain year has 
adopted none to six of the following provisions to limit shareholders’ rights: staggered 
board; limitation on amending bylaws; limitation on amending the charter; 
supermajority to approve a merger; golden parachute; and poison pill (Bebchuk et al., 
2009b). It is important to refer that the E-index is a construct based on data from the 
IRRC publications, which for the sample period from 2000 to 2008 occurred in 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008. Here, as in Bebchuk et al. (2009b), firm values for 
the years 2001, 2003 and 2005 were copied from the previous years, under the 
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assumption that provisions to diminish shareholders’ rights did not change between 
IRRC publications. 
 
Table 1 - Variable definitions and number of firm-year observations 
 Source Firm-year observations 
Dependent variables   
Earning Power 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
on Assets. 
Thomson Datastream:  
18191 Earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) 
02999 Total assets 
14,260 
Return on Assets 
Net Income on Assets. 
Thomson Datastream: 
01651 Net income – bottom line 
02999 Total assets 
14,804 
Return on Equity Thomson Datastream: 
08301 Return on equity – total % 
14,330 
Tobin’s Q 
(Book Value of Assets + Market 
Value of Equity – Book Value of 
Equity – Deferred Taxes) / Book 
Value of Assets. 
Thomson Datastream: 
02999 Total assets 
08001 Market capitalization 
03501 Common equity 
03263 Deferred taxes 
14,146 
 
Audit Fees variable 
  
Audit Fees Thomson Datastream: 
01801 Auditor fees 
11,225 
 
Control variables 
  
Assets Thomson Datastream: 
02999 Total assets 
14,819 
R&D Intensity 
Research and Development Expenses 
on Sales. 
Thomson Datastream: 
08341 Research and development/sales 
  9,805 
Capital Intensity 
Total Assets on Sales 
Thomson Datastream: 
02999 Total assets 
01001 Net sales or revenues 
14,790 
Sales Growth 
Sales 1-year growth 
Thomson Datastream: 
08631 Net sales/revenues – 1 yr annual 
growth 
14,611 
Leverage 
Long Term Debt on Assets. 
Thomson Datastream: 
03251 Long term debt 
02999 Total assets 
14,802 
Corporate Governance 
E-index. 
Data collected at the website of 
Harvard Law School (Bebchuk et al., 
2009a) 
10,243 
This table presents definitions of variables, data sources and number of firm-year observations. The 
sample period is from 2000 to 2008. 
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After careful examination of extreme outliers in the audit fees variable, some 
values were found to have measurement errors. Consulting statements and reports filed 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the firms and years in question 
confirmed this and thus these values were manually corrected
1
. The same procedure for 
the rest of the variables showed such errors did not generally exist. All unbounded 
continuous variables were winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles
2
. 
Model 
To test the hypothesis, the following equation is estimated, using panel data: 
 
                                  
                                                       
                                                    
                       
 
where i subscripts denote firms and t subscripts denote years, δ and θ stand for firm and 
year fixed effects, respectively, μ represents the error term and the remainder variables 
are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is LSDV. 
The hypothesis is confirmed if there is a significant negative relationship 
between audit fees and the operating performance measures. Audit fees are projected to 
arise for client firms with poor financial condition, because they are perceived as riskier 
in terms of the auditor’s liability exposure; so, higher levels of audit work are expected 
to be allocated, resulting in increasing fees (e.g., Bell et al., 2008; Simunic and Stein, 
1996).  
The coefficient sign for assets is expected to be positive, as it is well accepted 
that gains in efficiency and superior market power driven by the increase of a firm’s 
dimension prompt firm performance, although the relationship may not be linear (Lee, 
2009).  
                                                 
1
 Mainly, these measurement errors consisted in values being registered in millions of dollars when in fact 
they should have been registered in thousands of dollars. Understandably, there was a need to correct 
such errors or they would affect estimation results. 
2
 Figure 1 in the appendix section shows the effect of this procedure on one variable. 
(3.1) 
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According to Brush et al. (2000), an increased sales growth allows the use of full 
capacity, allocating fixed costs to more revenue, thus increasing firm profitability. In 
addition, growth is beneficial to firms operating in industries with economies of scale. 
Therefore, sales growth is also expected to be positively associated with the dependent 
variables.  
 At the operational level, the impact of leverage on performance must be only 
negatively significant for high levels of leverage. Regarding the ROE, the impact of 
leverage on performance depends on the relative values of the earning power and the 
cost of debt. 
The higher the E-index value a firm holds, the more restricted are its 
shareholders rights and, consequently, the less “well governed” the firm is; so this 
variable coefficient sign is expected to be negative (Bebchuk et al., 2009b). 
Capital and research and development intensities supposedly increase the market 
power of a firm (Lee, 2009). Artz et al. (2010) found that research and development 
spending is positively associated with patents, as well as product announcements, but 
these have opposite influences on the firm’s profitability. The sign of the coefficient 
associated with capital intensity is expected to be positive, but mixed results regarding 
research and development spending cause no predictions to be made as to the direction 
of this last influence on firm performance. 
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Table 2 – Expected signs for coefficients of equation (3.1) and brief theoretical 
explanations 
Coefficient Associated variable Expected sign Theoretical explanation 
α1 Ln(Audit_Fees) (-) 
Clients in a poor economic state are perceived as riskier 
and as such attributed more audit effort, resulting in 
higher audit fees. That is to say higher audit fees relate 
to lower firm performance. 
α2 Ln(Assets) (+) 
Larger firms obtain gains in efficiency related to 
economies of scale, as well as an influential position on 
their industry (market power). These attributes tend to 
make them more profitable. 
α3 R&D_Intensity  
While research and development intensity is generally 
perceived as empowering to the firm within its industry, 
results have shown mixed conclusions. No predictions 
are made.  
α4 Capital_Intensity (+) 
Capital intensity constitutes an entry barrier, increasing 
a firm’s market power, which translates to higher 
profitability. 
α5 Sales_Growth (+) 
Increasing sales growth renders full capacity usage, 
resulting in higher profitability. 
α6 Leverage (+/-) 
It depends on the variable used to measure firm 
performance. 
α7 E_Index (-) 
Firms with many restrictions to shareholders’ power 
(higher values of this index) are less well governed, in 
the sense that managers are relatively more able to 
pursue individual interests rather than those of the 
firms’ owners. As a result, lower performance levels are 
expected. 
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4. RESULTS 
The empirical results are presented in this section. Initially, data are analyzed 
through descriptive statistics and correlations. As a result, some changes in the initial 
model are made. Finally, estimation results are reported and analyzed, and conclusions 
are drawn. 
Univariate Results 
Analysis of histograms and boxplots for all variables revealed numerous extreme 
outliers, except for the corporate governance measure E-index. As previously stated, 
some of the audit fees extreme outliers were measurement errors and for that reason 
they were cautiously corrected; all other variables did not prove to register such errors. 
Winsorization at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles for each variable annual distribution (except 
the E-index) decreased the presence of extreme outliers, thus preventing possible biased 
results. In addition, the assets and audit fees variables are logarithmized, in order to 
linearize their effect on firm performance
3
. 
Descriptive statistics of variables included in equation (3.1) are presented in 
Table 3, and Table 4 reports correlations among the same variables. 
The three performance measures, EP, ROA and ROE, have mean values of 
approximately 6.6%, 2.0% and 5.7%, respectively. Mean firm value, represented by 
Tobin’s Q, is approximately 2.1. Average firm size (measured by total assets) is 
$4,154,097,000 and average fees paid to audit firms are $3,293,000. 
The examination of variables correlations (Table 4) allows to conclude that the 
three performance measures are, unsurprisingly, highly correlated. The test variable, 
Ln(Audit Fees) is, for the sample used, positively correlated with EP, ROA and ROE 
and negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Spearman correlations for the corporate 
governance measure also show a negative relation with Tobin’s Q. Ln(Assets) and Sales 
Growth are positively correlated with EP, ROA and ROE, while R&D Intensity, Capital 
Intensity and Leverage are negatively correlated with those variables. 
                                                 
3
 Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix illustrate the effects of winsorizing and logarithmizing for two variables. 
14 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics of equation (3.1) variables 
 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
EP 0.066 0.085 0.417 -0.752 0.158  14,260 
ROA 0.020 0.047 0.304 -0.862 0.155  14,804 
ROE 0.057 0.110 1.012 -1.842 0.344  14,330 
Tobin’s Q 2.104 1.606 9.192 0.672 1.497  14,146 
Audit Fees ($mil.) 3.293 1.600 32.100 0.140 4.995  11,225 
Ln(Audit Fees) 7.437 7.378 10.377 4.942 1.118  11,225 
Assets ($mil.) 4,154.097 987.676 56,032.050 35.766 8,874.150  14,819 
Ln(Assets) 13.949 13.803 17.841 10.485 1.579  14,819 
R&D Intensity 0.111 0.029 2.210 0.000 0.278  9,805 
Capital Intensity 1.544 1.067 13.814 0.248 1.755  14,790 
Sales Growth 0.149 0.094 2.010 -0.537 0.328  14,611 
Leverage 0.192 0.166 0.875 0.000 0.186  14,802 
E-Index 2.724 3.000 6.000 0.000 1.335  10,243 
This table reports descriptive statistics of variables included in equation (3.1). Variable definitions can be 
found in Table 1. The sample covers the period from 2000 to 2008. 
 
Table 4 – Correlations of equation (3.1) variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) EP  
 
0.947*** 0.796*** 0.176*** 0.106*** 0.191*** -0.453*** -0.333*** 0.086*** -0.064*** 0.039*** 
(2) ROA 0.930*** 
 
0.843*** 0.126*** 0.114*** 0.202*** -0.435*** -0.302*** 0.077*** -0.106*** 0.054*** 
(3) ROE 0.876*** 0.907*** 
 
0.130*** 0.119*** 0.199*** -0.384*** -0.259*** 0.069*** -0.083*** 0.051*** 
(4) Tobin’s Q 0.440*** 0.458*** 0.377*** 
 
-0.161*** -0.235*** 0.194*** 0.037*** 0.242*** -0.198*** -0.145*** 
(5) Ln(Audit Fees)  0.031*** 0.025*** 0.146*** -0.127*** 
 
0.776*** -0.223*** -0.115*** -0.055*** 0.173*** 0.080*** 
(6) Ln(Assets)  0.090*** 0.068*** 0.215*** -0.217*** 0.754*** 
 
-0.233*** 0.008000 -0.053*** 0.266*** 0.072*** 
(7) R&D Intensity  -0.299*** -0.225*** -0.299*** 0.285*** -0.083*** -0.270*** 
 
0.741*** 0.109*** -0.007000 -0.103*** 
(8) Capital Intensity  -0.293*** -0.261*** -0.244*** -0.045*** 0.034*** 0.144*** 0.545*** 
 
0.149*** 0.110*** -0.070*** 
(9) Sales Growth  0.276*** 0.282*** 0.276*** 0.289*** -0.027*** -0.020**0 0.033*** 0.065*** 
 
-0.038*** -0.026*** 
(10) Leverage  -0.113*** -0.217*** -0.013000 -0.319*** 0.251*** 0.388*** -0.288*** 0.138*** -0.072*** 
 
0.089*** 
(11) E-Index  0.005000 -0.001000 0.037*** -0.144*** 0.101*** 0.092*** -0.120*** -0.049*** -0.022**0 0.124*** 
 
This table reports Pearson and Spearman correlations above and below the diagonal, respectively, among variables included in equation (3.1), using pairwise samples 
covering the period from 2000 to 2008. ** and *** denote, respectively, coefficients’ significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Consult Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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A particular relevant correlation value is that of Ln(Audit Fees) with Ln(Assets): 
a significant Pearson correlation of 0,776. The audit pricing literature supports this 
finding, as size is often a critical explanatory variable in audit fee models (Hay et al., 
2006). It is possible, though, that including the test variable in the model thus 
represented (Ln(Audit Fees)) might yield biased results, since it is probable that it 
contains effects of size, already taken into account with Ln(Assets). Consequently, a 
first modification to equation (3.1) was made. The test variable was introduced as the 
ratio of audit fees on assets. 
Additionally, panel unit root tests on all variables rejected the hypothesis of non-
stationary processes, with the exception of the E-index variable: the Im, Pesaran and 
Shin and the Fisher ADF and PP tests do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for 
this variable. Transforming this variable (for example by computing the first difference 
for all observations) undermines the significance this index has. So, a different approach 
was used. Instead, two dummy variables were constructed, intended to represent good 
and bad governance: the former assumes the value of 1 for firms with an E-index score 
of 0, 1 or 2; the latter assumes the value of 1 for firms with an E-index score of 4, 5 or 
6. Equation (3.1) is, hence, modified: 
 
                                  
                                          
                                                         
                                                    
           
 
where i subscripts denote firms and t subscripts denote years, δ and θ stand for firm and 
year fixed effects, respectively, μ represents the error term, Audit_Fees/Assets, 
Good_Governance and Bad_Governance have the previously mentioned meaning and 
the remainder variables are defined in Table 1. It is important to point out that all 
coefficients’ signs maintain the predicted direction, except for the one associated with 
Good_Governance, that is expected to be positively related to the dependent variables. 
Descriptive statistics of the added variables can be found in Table 8, in the 
appendix section. 
(4.1) 
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Multivariate Results 
Equation (4.1) was regressed on each of the firm performance and value 
measures chosen for this research. LSDV estimation outputs are presented in Table 5, 
below. 
 
Table 5 – Equation (4.1) estimation results 
  
Eq. (4.1) on Eq. (4.1) on Eq. (4.1) on Eq. (4.1) on 
Independent variables 
Expected 
sign 
EP ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
Audit Fees/Assets (-) -7.702*** -7.162*** -17.363*** -16.478*00 
  
1.382000 1.371000 3.282000 9.936000 
Ln(Assets) (+) -0.005000 -0.004000 -0.000000 -0.671*** 
  
0.006000 0.006000 0.015000 0.047000 
R&D Intensity 
 
-0.340*** -0.367*** -0.464*** 0.521*** 
  
0.024000 0.024000 0.060000 0.176000 
Capital Intensity (+) 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.015*00 -0.073*** 
  
0.003000 0.003000 0.008000 0.024000 
Sales Growth (+) 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.159*** 0.448*** 
  
0.007000 0.007000 0.016000 0.049000 
Leverage (+/-) -0.118*** -0.133*** -0.335*** -0.203**0 
  
0.014000 0.014000 0.039000 0.101000 
Good Governance (+) 0.002000 -0.002000 0.008000 0.009000 
  
0.005000 0.005000 0.013000 0.039000 
Bad Governance (-) -0.005000 0.002000 -0.004000 0.032000 
  
0.005000 0.006000 0.013000 0.040000 
Intercept 
 
0.178**0 0.114000 0.169000 11.703*** 
  
0.090000 0.092000 0.219000 0.663000 
R-squared 
 
0.721000 0.688000 0.658000 0.797000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.638000 0.597000 0.557000 0.736000 
F-statistic 
 
8.702*** 7.559*** 6.533*** 12.941*** 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 5263.000000 5437.000000 5334.000000 5199.000000 
      
Firm effects - F test 4.828*** 3.929*** 4.193*** 10.811*** 
Firm effects - Chi-square test 4643.497*** 4115.235*** 4246.304*** 7515.062*** 
Year effects - F test 13.159*** 17.508*** 8.137*** 83.358*** 
Year effects - Chi-square test 134.853*** 178.023*** 83.601*** 804.258*** 
Firm and Year effects - F test 5.019*** 4.187*** 4.321*** 11.272*** 
Firm and Year effects - Chi-square test 4785.644*** 4321.159*** 4354.592*** 7708.534*** 
This table reports LSDV estimation results of equation (4.1), as well redundant fixed effects tests. *, ** 
and *** denote coefficients significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Values below 
coefficients are corresponding standard-deviations. The panel sample covers the period from 2000 to 
2008. Consult Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Results are consistent with what was predicted, with some exceptions. Sales 
growth is statistically significant in all estimations and its coefficient has the expected 
sign. Leverage is also statistically significant and has a negative impact on firm 
operating performance, as well as on firm financial performance and firm value. 
Research and development intensity seems to negatively influence firm performance, 
but positively influence firm value; the opposite happens for capital intensity. Firm size 
is significant only when determining firm value and, even then, it has a negative 
influence. This result is contrary to what was expected. The corporate governance 
measures are not statistically significant in this model determining EP, ROA, ROE or 
Tobin’s Q. Even so, the most important result is that of audit fees on assets: this 
variable is significantly and negatively related with the performance and value 
variables. Adjusted R
2
 varies, for the performance estimations, between 56% and 64%, 
approximately. 
Cross-section and period fixed effects were included in all estimations, to 
account for individual firm and year effects. Tests performed in all of them rejected the 
hypothesis of redundant firm and/or year fixed effects. 
 
 
As an additional test, the dummy variables representative of good and bad 
governance were substituted by a single measure: insider ownership or institutional 
ownership. Connelly et al. (2010) provide a review of the role of owners in governance. 
When insiders own equity they tend to take actions more in line with the interests of 
shareholders. This evidence is more pronounced for non-executive employees. On the 
other hand, there is empirical evidence that institutional ownership is positively 
associated with governance quality (Chung and Zhang, 2011). These two variables are 
tested alternatively. 
With the intent of eliminating completely the effect of firm dimension on the 
amount of fees paid to its auditor, another change was made. Following Bhattacharya et 
al. (2012), an orthogonalized audit fees variable was created by regressing audit fees on 
assets. The resulting residuals represent the part of audit fees unexplained by firm size. 
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The following equations are, then, used: 
 
                                  
                                                        
                                                    
                                 
 
                                  
                                                        
                                                    
                                       
 
where i subscripts denote firms and t subscripts denote years, δ and θ stand for firm and 
year fixed effects, respectively, μ represents the error term, Audit_Fees_orth, 
Insider_Ownership and Institutional_Ownership have the above mentioned meaning 
and the remainder variables are defined in Table 1
4
. The orthogonalized audit fees 
variable maintains the predicted coefficient negative sign, and insider or institutional 
ownership are expected to be positively related to firm performance and value 
(Connelly et al., 2010; Chung and Zhang, 2011). 
Descriptive statistics of variables included at this stage can be consulted in Table 
8 in the appendix. Also in that section, Table 9 shows the results of estimating equations 
(4.2) and (4.3) but using the previous audit fees representative variable (audit fees on 
assets), so the effects of changing the corporate governance measure are singularized. 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of equations (4.2) and (4.3). Since 
Thomson Datastream did not return data on insider ownership and institutional 
ownership for 2000 and 2001, these results are applicable for the sample period from 
2002 to 2008. 
The changes performed in the model’s equation brought somewhat different 
results. Although corporate governance remains statistically insignificant, size has now 
a significant and positive influence on firm performance. Table 9 in the appendix shows 
                                                 
4
 Insider ownership and institutional ownership are, respectively, Thomson Datastream’s Free Float 
Employee Held Shares – datatype (NOSHEM) and Investment company held shares – datatype 
(NOSHIC). 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
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this change in the significant of Ln(Assets) may have happened with the first 
modification that was made to the model – the substitution of insider or institutional 
ownership for good and bad governance. Sales one-year growth maintains its positive 
and statistically significant impact on firm performance. Research and development 
intensity has a negative impact on performance, while capital intensity affects 
performance positively. These results do not allow to confirm the notion that the former 
firm characteristic constitutes an entry barrier and brings market power. Leverage 
maintains a significantly negative association with firm performance and value. 
The test variable, (orthogonalized) audit fees, is statistically significant and bares 
negative coefficients’ signs. However, the absolute values of coefficients are relatively 
small, which may indicate that audit fees unexplained by firm size are less associated 
with firm performance. It is worth noting, nevertheless, the difference in variables’ 
units: while the test variable is introduced in thousands of dollars, each performance 
dependent variable is a ratio, varying from -1.842 to 1.012 (see Tables 3 and 8). So, 
caution is needed when interpreting these results. 
In addition, an untabulated analysis of the connection of past audit fees with 
current firm performance did not return significant results. This contradicts the notion 
that audit fees may reflect not only the current year but also the next year economic 
condition of that client. 
Overall, reported results indicate that there is no reason to discard this study’s 
hypothesis of operating performance (measured by EP or ROA) being associated with 
current year fees paid to audit firms. That same association happens, in addition, for 
financial performance (measured by ROE). Furthermore, the relationship is negative: 
increases (decreases) in firm performance are connected with decreases (increases) in 
audit fees. 
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Table 6 – Equations (4.2) and (4.3) estimation results 
  
EP ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
Independent variables Expected sign (4.2) (4.3) (4.2) (4.3) (4.2) (4.3) (4.2) (4.3) 
Audit Fees orthogonalized       (-) -1.62E-06**0 -1.63E-06**0 -2.30E-06*** -2.31E-06*** -3.85E-06*0 -3.84E-06*0 -1.04E-05*00 -1.04E-05000 
  
7.76E-07000 7.76E-07000 8.22E-07000 8.21E-07000 2.00E-06000 2.00E-06000 6.30E-06000 6.30E-06000 
Ln(Assets) (+) 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.060*** 0.059*** -0.664*** -0.665*** 
  
0.005000 0.005000 0.005000 0.005000 0.012000 0.012000 0.039000 0.039000 
R&D Intensity 
 
-0.242*** -0.242*** -0.285*** -0.285*** -0.560*** -0.560*** 0.130000 0.131000 
  
0.017000 0.017000 0.017000 0.017000 0.048000 0.048000 0.132000 0.132000 
Capital Intensity (+) 0.005**0 0.005**0 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
  
0.002000 0.002000 0.002000 0.002000 0.006000 0.006000 0.018000 0.018000 
Sales Growth (+) 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.606*** 0.606*** 
  
0.005000 0.005000 0.006000 0.006000 0.014000 0.014000 0.043000 0.043000 
Leverage (+/-) -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.392*** -0.392*** -0.260*** -0.258*** 
  
0.012000 0.012000 0.013000 0.013000 0.037000 0.037000 0.099000 0.099000 
Insider Ownership (+) -0.019000 
 
-0.000000 
 
0.032000 
 
0.147000 
 
  
0.022000 
 
0.023000 
 
0.056000 
 
0.179000 
 
Institutional Ownership (+) 
 
0.005000 
 
0.012000 
 
0.008000 
 
0.019000 
   
0.012000 
 
0.013000 
 
0.030000 
 
0.097000 
Intercept 
 
-0.305*** -0.308*** -0.271*** -0.271*** -0.695*** -0.691*** 11.515*** 11.535*** 
  
0.066000 0.066000 0.069000 0.069000 0.167000 0.167000 0.530000 0.530000 
R-squared 
 
0.697000 0.697000 0.639000 0.639000 0.605000 0.605000 0.768000 0.768000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.626000 0.626000 0.558000 0.558000 0.514000 0.514000 0.714000 0.714000 
F-statistic 
 
9.899*** 9.898*** 7.860*** 7.862*** 6.667*** 6.666*** 14.171*** 14.169*** 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 6644. 000000 6644.000000 6894.000000 6894.000000 6716. 000000 6716.000000 6610.000000 6610.000000 
          
Firm effects - F test 5.582*** 5.563*** 4.078*** 4.032*** 4.169*** 4.144*** 10.967*** 10.952*** 
Firm effects - Chi-square test 5483.961*** 5471.308*** 4460.862*** 4423.158*** 4479.065*** 4459.672*** 8353.899*** 8347.570*** 
Year effects - F test 25.319*** 25.036*** 30.330*** 30.530*** 13.404*** 14.155*** 129.061*** 130.976*** 
Year effects - Chi-square test 184.634*** 182.595*** 219.503*** 220.928*** 98.204*** 103.661*** 892.598*** 904.974*** 
Firm and Year effects - F test 5.703*** 5.731*** 4.231*** 4.253*** 4.231*** 4.239*** 11.516*** 11.533*** 
Firm and Year effects - Chi-square test 5582.888*** 5601.240*** 4598.407*** 4616.350*** 4543.600*** 4550.305*** 8610.695*** 8617.428*** 
This table reports LSDV estimation results of equations (4.2) and (4.3), as well redundant fixed effects tests. *, ** and *** denote coefficients significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. Values below coefficients are corresponding standard-deviations. The panel sample covers the period from 2002 to 2008. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There are multiple studies investigating firm performance, in particular studies 
on which firm characteristics drive performance. On the other hand, research on the 
pricing of audit fees has empirically proved that the financial condition of a client is a 
critical factor, in the sense that riskier clients demand more thorough audit procedures. 
Auditors have a potentially privileged position in assessing client firms’ economic 
condition, and so, required audit fees may be a reasonable pointer of the direction a 
specific firm’s performance is taking. This study’s purpose is to see whether this 
statement holds, from the firm performance perspective. 
Using a fixed effects model and a sample of U.S. publicly traded, non-financial 
firms covering the period from 2000 to 2008 (approximately 6000 firm-year 
observations) and the LSDV estimator, fixed effects regressions on firm operating 
performance were conducted. The model’s equations included standard control 
variables, such as size, leverage, sales growth and research and development intensity. 
In addition, different measures of corporate governance were (alternatively) introduced. 
The model allowed for individual firm and year effects. The variable subject to testing – 
audit fees – was firstly considered as a ratio (on assets), and later it was orthogonalized, 
in an attempt to mitigate the effects of firm dimension on the explanatory power of audit 
fees. 
Estimations’ results provide empirical evidence on the relationship between firm 
performance and audit fees. Specifically, increases (decreases) in operating performance 
are connected with decreases (increases) in audit fees. This relationship also applies to 
financial performance. Therefore, the advanced hypothesis of this study is not rejected. 
This research has some limitations. First of all, although the sampling process 
resulted in at least 9000 firm-year observations, it might have left out relevant firms, 
that either were not identified on Thomson Datastream or were not present on the E-
Index file to begin with. Also, the data restrictions encountered when considering a 
corporate governance measure may explain the weak results on this variable. 
Particularly, the use of a different estimation method to account for the endogeneity of 
corporate governance and performance could have helped to understand these results. 
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On account of this limitation, it was also not possible to investigate whether corporate 
governance and audit fees constitute complementary or substitute controls. Another 
limitation lies with the possible misspecification of the study’s model. Individual firm 
and year fixed effects play an important role on the global significance of results. 
To better understand the association of audit fees to firm performance, further 
research on this relationship is needed. For example, disaggregating audit fees on fees 
paid for audit services and fees paid for consultancy; analyzing the unexpected change 
in audit fees; and/or examining more thoroughly the relationship with past audit fees. 
Nevertheless, this investigation provides initial grounds on the performance 
perspective of the stated association. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1 – Boxplots of the variable Earning Power before and after winsorization at the 
1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles 
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Figure 2 – Histograms of the variable Assets (winsorized) before and after 
logarithmization 
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Table 7 – Industry profile of sample firms 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of firms (Total = 14,826) 1,798 1,769 1,769 1,742 1,702 1,638 1,563 1,458 1,387 
Agriculture 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 
Food Products 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.3% 2.4% 
Candy & Soda 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Beer & Liquor 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 
Tobacco Products 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 
Recreation 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 
Entertainment 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 
Printing and Publishing 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 
Consumer Goods 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 
Apparel 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 
Healthcare 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 
Medical Equipment 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.6% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.5% 3.5% 
Pharmaceutical Products 5.3% 5.3% 5.2% 5.0% 5.1% 4.9% 4.8% 4.8% 4.5% 
Chemicals 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.7% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 
Textiles 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Construction Materials 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.2% 
Construction 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 
Steel Works Etc 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.6% 1.7% 
Fabricated Products 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Machinery 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.9% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 
Electrical Equipment 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 
Automobiles and Trucks 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 
Aircraft 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Defense 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Precious Metals 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Non-Metallic & Industrial Metal Mining 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Coal 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.8% 
Utilities 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 5.3% 5.5% 5.3% 5.4% 
Communication 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 
Personal Services 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 
Business Services 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 7.8% 8.1% 8.0% 7.8% 7.9% 
Computers 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 
Computer Software 9.4% 9.4% 9.3% 9.1% 8.9% 8.5% 7.9% 7.8% 7.6% 
Electronic Equipment 8.5% 8.5% 8.4% 8.4% 8.5% 8.5% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 
Measuring and Control Equipment 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.9% 2.7% 2.7% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 
Business Supplies 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 
Shipping Containers 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 
Transportation 2.6% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.9% 2.9% 3.0% 2.9% 3.0% 
Wholesale 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 3.8% 3.7% 
Retail 7.5% 7.5% 7.6% 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 8.1% 8.4% 8.4% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.8% 2.8% 2.9% 2.7% 2.7% 
Almost Nothing 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 8 – Descriptive Statistics of variables subsequently included in the model 
 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
Audit Fees/Assets 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.002  11,225 
Audit Fees orthogonalized ($mil.) 1.203 0.785 30.524 -21.382 3.337  11,225 
Good Governance 0.426 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.495  10,243 
Bad Governance 0.287 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.452  10,243 
Insider Ownership 0.028 0.000 0.480 0.000 0.082  10,819 
Institutional Ownership 0.285 0.240 0.750 0.000 0.204  10,819 
This table reports descriptive statistics of variables subsequently used (not present in Table 3). The 
sample covers the period from 2000 to 2008, but data on insider ownership and institutional ownership is 
not available for the first two years. 
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Table 9 – Equations (4.2) and (4.3) with previous audit fees variable estimation results 
  
EP ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
Independent Variables Expected sign (4.2)♣ (4.3)♣ (4.2)♣ (4.3)♣ (4.2)♣ (4.3)♣ (4.2)♣ (4.3)♣ 
Audit Fees/Assets♣ (-) -5.726*** -5.760*** -4.976*** -5.009*** -10.361*** -10.333*** -19.147**0 -18.960**0 
  
1.047000 -5.502000 1.071000 1.071000 2.577000 2.577000 8.223000 8.222000 
Ln(Assets) (+) 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.043*** 0.043*** -0.694*** -0.696*** 
  
0.005000 3.829000 0.005000 0.005000 0.013000 0.013000 0.041000 0.041000 
R&D Intensity 
 
-0.244*** -0.244*** -0.287*** -0.287*** -0.562*** -0.561*** 0.125000 0.126000 
  
0.017000 -14.723000 0.017000 0.017000 0.048000 0.048000 0.132000 0.132000 
Capital Intensity (+) 0.005**0 0.005**0 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.016**0 0.016**0 -0.076*** -0.077*** 
  
0.002000 2.044000 0.002000 0.002000 0.006000 0.006000 0.018000 0.018000 
Sales Growth (+) 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.604*** 0.605*** 
  
0.005000 14.282000 0.006000 0.006000 0.014000 0.014000 0.043000 0.043000 
Leverage (+/-) -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.386*** -0.386*** -0.249**0 -0.247**0 
  
0.012000 -9.887000 0.013000 0.013000 0.037000 0.037000 0.099000 0.099000 
Insider Ownership (+) -0.016000 
 
0.002000 
 
0.038000 
 
0.158000 
 
  
0.022000 
 
0.023000 
 
0.056000 
 
0.179000 
 
Institutional Ownership (+) 
 
0.006000 
 
0.014000 
 
0.011000 
 
0.025000 
   
0.528000 
 
0.013000 
 
0.030000 
 
0.097000 
Intercept 
 
-0.165**0 -0.166** -0.150**0 -0.148**0 -0.443**0 -0.439**0 11.972*** 11.989*** 
  
0.071000 0.071000 0.074000 0.074000 0.180000 0.180000 0.570000 0.570000 
R-squared 
 
0.698000 0.698000 0.640000 0.640000 0.606000 0.606000 0.768000 0.768000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.628000 0.628000 0.559000 0.559000 0.515000 0.515000 0.714000 0.714000 
F-statistic 
 
9.967*** 9.966*** 7.890*** 7.892*** 6.692*** 6.691*** 14.180*** 14.178*** 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 6644.000000 6644.000000 6894.000000 6894.000000 6716.000000 6716.000000 6610.000000 6610.000000 
          
Firm effects - F test 5.272*** 5.273*** 3.793*** 3.773*** 4.012*** 3.999*** 10.875*** 10.873*** 
Firm effects - Chi-square test 5273.809*** 5274.518*** 4227.370*** 4210.637*** 4355.263*** 4344.504*** 8314.105*** 8313.346*** 
Year effects - F test 27.733*** 27.234*** 32.364*** 32.485*** 14.364*** 15.211*** 129.578*** 131.454*** 
Year effects - Chi-square test 201.970*** 198.393*** 233.975*** 234.837*** 105.180*** 111.334*** 895.942*** 908.058*** 
Firm and Year effects - F test 5.461*** 5.483*** 4.021*** 4.044*** 4.110*** 4.120*** 11.429*** 11.448*** 
Firm and Year effects - Chi-square test 5420.433*** 5435.429*** 4430.391*** 4448.400*** 4448.884*** 4456.731*** 8574.114*** 8582.031*** 
This table reports LSDV estimation results of equations (4.2) and (4.3) with the former audit fees variable (♣), as well redundant fixed effects tests. *, ** and *** 
denote coefficients significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Values below coefficients are corresponding standard-deviations. The panel sample covers 
the period from 2002 to 2008. 
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